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a b s t r a c t
This paper estimates the value of a statistical life from commercial Himalayan expeditions. Because deaths
occur with a fair amount of regularity, fatality rates are calculated for each mountain trail and are, hence,
disaggregated measures of risk. Also, since the marginal product of labor in the industry is (in part) the
marginal product of safety, our revenue measures may account for unobserved safety-related productivity of
guides. Guide safety is explicitly observed by market participants, and is reﬂected in higher wages for safer
guides. Our VSL estimates are about $5 M.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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"Anything on Everest is dangerous. It's not safe. This is crazy. I
mean, you're going into the death zone." — Russell Brice,
professional guide, Everest: Beyond the Limit, Discovery Channel.

1. Introduction
Society may face choices that involve a tradeoff between physical
risk and pecuniary returns, and our decisions reveal our willingness to
trade money for the risk of physical harm (Ashenfelter, 2006).
Economists have recognized the existence of this tradeoff since the
time of Adam Smith (1776), and this tradeoff is often called the value
of a “statistical life” or VSL. Econometric estimates of the VSL are used
for understanding and informing public policies where risk/reward
tradeoffs are important (Kniesner et al., 2006). There is an extremely
rich literature on estimating the VSL, and we will not do it justice here.
Early modern treatments are Thaler and Rosen (1976) and Viscusi
(1978). In-depth surveys are Viscusi (1993) and Viscusi and Aldy
(2003). Recent papers are Ashenfelter (2006), Ashenfelter and
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Greenstone (2004), Kniesner et al. (2006), Kniesner et al. (2010),
Schnier et al. (2009), and Viscusi (2009), to name a few.
This research estimates the VSL from detailed risk/reward data
collected from recent expeditions into the Himalayan Mountains of
Nepal and India. For the majority of the 20th century, climbing in the
Himalaya was for scientiﬁc purposes, so there is a lasting tradition of
detailed record keeping: expedition size, daily accents, injuries, deaths,
equipment, Sherpas, peak, trail, etc. Therefore, current data on
commercial (for-pay) expeditions are ideally suited for producing a
VSL estimate, while avoiding many of the conceptual and econometric
problems that have plagued (and perhaps biased) estimates in the past.
Using a standard two-stage, hedonic regression of expedition revenues
on expedition fatality risk, we ﬁnd VSLs between $4.05 M and $5.39 M.
Our estimates are calculated for paid guides (not paying climbers) from
developed countries with the U.S. (35%), U.K. (22%), New Zealand (14%)
and Germany (14%) representing the majority of our observations.1
Ashenfelter (2006) and Kniesner et al. (2006) discuss several
econometric problems related to VSL estimation: endogeneity of risks,
omitted safety-related productivity bias, heterogeneity of preferences,
and errors in the fatality risk measure. All of these issues are addressed
in this research to a greater or lesser extent. For example, the ﬁnal data
set spans 10 years, so lags of fatality risk are valid instruments for today's
fatality risk. Also, one of a mountain guide's primary outputs is the

1
Clearly, mountain guide risk preferences may be different from the general
population.
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production of safety.2 Insofar as observed revenues capture the marginal
product of safety, there is no unobserved safety-related productivity. 3
That is, in risky occupations a worker's wage may reﬂect a compensating
differential, but workers are rarely paid for their safety-related
behaviors (be they observed or unobserved by the employer).
Therefore, a worker's ability to mitigate risk is neither observed
explicitly by the econometrician nor implicitly through a wage
adjustment for safe behavior. Once we observe revenues in the
mountain guide industry we may implicitly observe safety-related
behavior, because the wage is adjusted for this behavior through the
market mechanism. 4 Hence, omitted safety-related productivity is not
an issue (or at least is less of an issue) for these data.
Measurement error refers to the fact that measured fatality risk may
not correspond to the actual risks faced by workers, and this may manifest
itself as an aggregation problem. That is, at fairly disaggregate levels there
may be few deaths, so fatality rates may be imprecise. Therefore to
improve precision fatality rates are often calculated at more aggregate
levels to estimate the VSL. Our data allow us to calculate fatality risk at
fairly disaggregate levels and still incur a fair number of deaths. Hence, we
can calculate fatality rates in different ways: for the entire Himalayan
region, particular peaks, particular trails on peaks, and even for particular
guides. Even at extremely disaggregate levels, fatalities can be non-zero in
this industry.5 We demonstrate empirically the effect of aggregation on
the estimated VSL for these data. (e.g., $5.39 M for trail deaths vs. $4.05 M
for peak deaths).
Also, because we observe individual guides on different expeditions
(a pseudo-panel), any heterogeneity of risk preferences can be
controlled with panel data techniques (e.g., ﬁxed effects).6 Additionally,
we observe single agents paid heterogeneous wages in heterogeneous
risk environments within the same data, providing another source of
variability that helps us conﬁdently pin down our VSL estimates. 7 Lalive
(2003) discusses heterogeneity of risk across occupations, and argues
that aggregate measures of risk do not uncover (or exploit) this
variability, and my lead to biased VSL estimates. Therefore, our ability to
observe the same guide in heterogeneous risk environments (e.g.,
different trails and peaks) also speaks to the aggregation and
measurement errors problem. Again, we are able to pin down the real
risks at low levels of aggregation and, hence, with high levels of risk
heterogeneity.
One drawback of this research is that the electronic data purchased
from the Himalaya Database does not contain revenue data. Therefore,
we collect “per climber” revenue data from commercial climbing
company websites and merge it with the climb data. Internet prices
vary by guide and by peak. To capture price variability over time, we
used the Internet Wayback Machine to record historical prices at each
website. Therefore, our left-hand side variable may be measured with
error, but we believe the errors are random, as we shall describe.
2
Guides are also paid for their ability to get climbers to the summit of the peak.
However, ‘getting to the top’ implies ‘getting to the top in one piece,’ so climber safety
has to be an important output for the guide. In fact, guides are paid full wages
regardless of getting to the top of the peak. Informal conversations with guides reveal
that there are reputational incentives at work in this specialized ﬁeld. Getting to the
top can improve a reputation, but losing climbers on the way to the top can damage a
reputation.
3
In fact, any safety measures that we included in our hedonic wage model (e.g.,
oxygen and rope) were insigniﬁcant.
4
Taken this way, one could envision the wage as life or injury insurance. However,
monitoring on the part of the insurer is perfect, since the guides observe client
behavior. There are no reliable measures of injuries in the data.
5
Even though we cannot produce feasible results with a fatality measure at the
guide level, it is interesting to note that there can be deaths associated with a
particular guide (a client death), yet he continues to be observed in the data. Death is a
production “bad”. There can be death without the paid risk-taker leaving the data set.
6
We actually ﬁnd that guide-speciﬁc ﬁxed-effects are small and do not affect the
estimated VSL, so in our analyses ﬁxed-effects (i.e., heterogeneity of risk preferences)
are ignored.
7
Any panel dataset where workers change jobs may possess these features, but our
‘workers’ change ‘jobs’ frequently.

Additionally, our results change very little when we limit the data to
only current internet prices ($3.8 M to $5.1 M), so we feel that the
historical imputation is fairly innocuous.
Another drawback of this study is conceptual: mountain guides may
not be central to the distribution of societal risk preferences, so the
applicability of the results to policies involving the general public may
be questioned. Even if this is a problem, it is not unreasonable to
envision public policy geared towards risk-loving individuals. The
proliferation of extreme sports and their effect on the environment may
be of importance to policy-makers. Also, there are costs and beneﬁts
associated with outdoor recreational sports (e.g., white water rafting,
skiing, hunting, etc.). Perhaps policy analysis of these endeavors
requires a VSL from a subpopulation with proclivities for risk-taking
behavior. Finally, it could be argued that combat soldiers are relatively
risk-loving, so the VSL of mountain guides may be more useful for
calculating the human costs of war than the mean VSL. That being said,
our ﬁnal estimates are not different from typical estimates in the
literature. For example, Schnier et al. (2009) estimate a $4–5 M VSL for
crab ﬁshermen, a fairly risky occupation. Kniesner et al. (2006) estimate
$5.5–7.5 M from census labor data, and Ashenfelter and Greenstone
(2004) estimate $1.6 M from policy decisions on highway speed limits.
The US DOT uses $5.8 M per life for trafﬁc fatalities (Viscusi, 2009).
This research confronts and overcomes several other conceptual
issues with the VSL. For example, in many studies it is not clear that
the decision-makers are even aware of what the true risks may be
(Ashenfelter, 2006). Since mountain guides regularly face real lifeand-death decisions, they are speciﬁcally trained to understand the
inherent risks of their occupation, so our data avoid this problem. Also,
Ashenfelter (2006) points out that there may be agency issues in the
decision process that may distort the VSL. The idea is that the agents at
risk may not be in complete control of the decision to engage in the
risky behavior. This is particularly relevant when managers (agents)
control behavior or when governments control laws that affect the
safety of others. Schnier et al. (2009) confront this issue in a
meaningful way by examining the decisions of captains on crabbing
vessels, but even in their study, the risks to captains in stormy seas are
distinctly different from the risk to deck hands. In our empirical
framework the risk environment of the decision-maker (the guide)
and the people in his/her charge (assistant guides and Sherpas) are
identical, and this intimate “physical” link between the guide and
his/her charges mitigates agency problems. (Indeed, climbers may
literally be linked with ropes on the more dangerous portions of the
climb.) Ultimately our analysis measures the marginal rate of
substitution between “paid climber” revenues (guides, assistant
guides and Sherpas) and expected paid climber deaths, so we are
teasing out a compensating differential for paid climbers. 8 Since we
are ignoring the lives of the “paying climbers” (unpaid expedition
members), agency issues are unimportant to our analysis.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
industry and our data. Section 3 presents the hedonic revenue model
and our two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the VSL. We
highlight the sensitivity of our VSL results to levels of fatality risk
aggregation. The last section summarizes and concludes.
2. Industry and data
2.1. Industry
The mountain climbing industry consists of small companies, owned
and operated by lead guides who are seasoned climbers. A wellestablished lead guide has anywhere from 10 to 20 assistant guides and
manages six to eight trips a year in places such as Ecuador, Tanzania,
Argentina, Russia, France, Italy, New Zealand, and, of course, Nepal and
8
In our analyses we cannot distinguish between the wages of the guides and
Sherpas, so we cannot estimate a separate VSL for guide and Sherpas.
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Pakistan. He has anywhere from 50 to 100 climbing clients per year.
A Himalayan lead guide must be certiﬁed by the local governments
of Nepal, Tibet and China and be familiar with the Katmandu and
Himalayan valleys. The lead guide hires assistant guides and Sherpas.
Assistant guides are typically company employees with good climbing
experience, but without the reputation (or certiﬁcation) that the lead
guide has developed over time. The Sherpas are contract laborers that
are Nepal natives and extremely experienced climbers in their own
right. The lead guide typically has his favorite Sherpas in Nepal which he
hires every time he visits the country.
Most trips into the Himalaya take about a month (28.8 days on
average) and gross revenues are about $150,000 on average. Many of
the approach hikes are a week long and the climbs may take as long as
two months as climbers acclimate (become accustom to the higher
altitude), build camps high on the mountain, and wait out dangerous
weather conditions. Clients are typically interviewed by the lead
guide prior to signing a contract to ensure that they have adequate
climbing experience and to ensure that they are physically ﬁt. Once
the climb begins, clients are tested for endurance and speed as they
complete acclimation hikes. Eventually the lead guide will break the
expedition team into groups of two or three clients. When summit day
arrives, the guide takes the fastest group and assigns Sherpas or
assistant guides to each of the other groups. Throughout the climb he
has the ﬁnal decision to continue or turn back. (Reasons for turning
back are always safety-related.) However, his assistants and Sherpas
also have authority to turn back at any point they feel uncomfortable
or feel that the safety of their groups are compromised. If an assistant
or Sherpa decides to turn back, typically other groups continue
forward. However if the leader turns back, everyone goes back. The
leader takes ultimate responsibility for the safety of all clients and,
therefore, always has the ﬁnal word on safety.
Deaths can occur for a variety of reasons with avalanches and falls
being a common cause. Climbers have been known to trip and slide down
the mountain. Those who live may sustain sprains or broken bones and
are typically carried back down the mountain. Some slide off the path, are
deemed inaccessible to rescue crews, and are left for dead. There are also
deaths related to the high altitudes: heart attack, stroke, cerebral edema
or pulmonary edema. While weather conditions are carefully monitored,
they can change abruptly, resulting in hypothermia, blindness or
starvation from being snowed in for too long.9 Most who die are left in
place. The culture is that it is not worth risking more lives to carry a corpse
down difﬁcult mountain paths.
2.2. Fatality data
Our data are taken from Salisbury and Hawley (2007), including
updates downloaded from http://www.HimalayanDatabase.com. The
database includes detailed descriptions and notes for 5965 expeditions
that took place from 1950 to 2008. The primary unit of observation is the
expedition (effectively “the guide”). For each expedition, we know the
starting date, the number of clients, guides, Sherpas, the number of
climbers who reached the summit, the duration of the expedition, the
termination date and reason, the number of camps, the highpoint
reached, the amount of extra safety rope used, whether or not the team
used supplemental oxygen, the peak climbed and the route taken
(called the trail), the height of the peak, the name of the team leader, and
the nationality of the guide company. An expedition team consists of a
single team leader, who is the primary guide and decision maker,
assistant guides, Sherpas, and clients. A guide experience variable is
created by identifying all of the climbs the team leader has led in the
Himalaya. This variable is speciﬁc to the leader and is not created for
assistant guides since they cannot easily be tracked by name in the data.
9
Weather would be a valid instrument for fatalities, but it is only available at the
regional level. Since our goal is to measure disaggregate levels of fatality risk, weather
was not a practical instrument in our case.
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We focus on expeditions from 1987 to 2007, a period during which
modern techniques and equipment were in standard use. Prior to 1987,
climbers used equipment which was less advanced and, in many cases,
less safe. This limits our number of expeditions to 4372. It is important to
note that over this period there were many deaths. For example, on
average there were 3.3 deaths and 729 lives at risks over the relevant
three-year periods on the trails associated with our ﬁnal dataset,
resulting in a death rate of about 0.45%. Of these, Everest was the worst.
The 32 Everest expeditions in our data faced three-year average
frequencies of 6.56 deaths in about 751 lives at risk for a death rate of
0.87%. The point is that deaths are fairly common, so our fatality rates,
based on three-year moving averages, are potentially fairly precise.
Our empirical approach regresses expedition revenue on expected
deaths (the aggregate fatality rate times the number of at-risk paid
climbers on an expedition) and other variables related to revenue.
Since we have a pseudo-panel, we use lagged expected deaths as an
instrument for expected deaths in a 2SLS framework. Expected deaths
are generated for each observation at three different levels of
aggregation. The most disaggregate level of the expected deaths
variable is a three-year moving average on each speciﬁc trail in the
range. Calculations proceed as follows. First a fatality rate is calculated
for the three years of interest on the trail of interest. This is
accomplished by dividing deaths for all climbers by the number of
at-risk climbers on the trail over the three-year period. (This fatality
rate is based on three-years of fatality data culled from our sample of
4372 expeditions between 1987 and 2007.) The expected deaths of
the expedition on the trail is this fatality rate times the number of paid
professional climbers at risk. (Note that we are using the fatality rate
for all climbers in calculating the expected deaths of paid climbers.
This is because we cannot differentiate between deaths of clients and
paid personnel in the data. It is not clear that there should be a
difference between these death rates.) Similarly, three-year moving
averages are calculated for each peak (an aggregation of trails on each
peak) and for the entire region (all peaks in the mountain range). 10
The implication of our expected deaths measure is that we are aggregating the lives of the guides, assistant guides and Sherpas into one
representative agent, which is necessary given the fact that our wage
measure is gross revenue for the entire expedition, a large percentage
of which is paid out to assistant guides and Sherpas. 11
One problem that arises when calculating expected deaths is
accounting for observations in which the fatality rate is zero in any
three-year period. After discussions with several guides it seemed that
“zero-deaths” was an unrealistic expectation for an industry whose
main purpose is to produce safety for clients. (See the Russell Brice
quote before the Introduction.) Zero deaths occur more frequently at
more disaggregate levels of observation. 12 To circumvent this
problem we also consider a calculation in which the expected deaths
at the trail-level is used ﬁrst, if that number is zero then the expected
deaths at the peak-level is used for the trail, and if both are zero then
the expected deaths at the regional level is used for the trail (deaths,
trail/peak/region). We suspect that this last calculation most likely
represents the true expectations of guides, since it potentially
incorporates information on deaths as higher levels of aggregation
when deaths at lower levels of aggregation are unobserved. We also
view this innovation as an important contribution to the VSL
literature, and believe that this fatality measure produces our most
credible VSL estimate of $4.69 M, as we shall see.
Summary statistics for the four expected death measures are
contained in Table 1. After all data cleaning, accounting for the three-

10
Our choice of a three-year moving average was effectively data-driven as we
explain later.
11
We do not have complete cost data to calculate net proﬁt for the lead guide, so
lumping professional climbers in this way is our only option.
12
This precluded us from doing an analysis at the guide-level, which would have
been interesting.
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Table 1
Summary statistics for 155 recent expeditions.
Variable
Expected deaths
Expected deaths
Expected deaths
Expected deaths
Revenues
Days
Experience

(trail)
(peak)
(region)
(trail/peak/region)

Average

Std. dev.

Coeff. var.

Min.

Max

Observations

0.0450
0.0423
0.0647
0.0517
$147,978
28.32
4.40

0.0821
0.0667
0.0802
0.0795
$210,903
14.38
5.26

1.83
1.57
1.24
1.54
1.43
0.50
1.20

0
0
0.0062
0.0014
$5,534
6
1

0.4423
0.3884
0.5297
0.4422
$1,616,340
80
24

155
155
155
155
155
155
155

year lag needed for instrumental variables, and limiting the data to
only the most recent trips for purposes of merging with revenue data,
the total sample used for the analysis is 155 recent commercial
expeditions. (Historical revenue data only go back to 1996.) 13 For
deaths at the trail-level the average expectation across the 155
expeditions is 0.0450 lives lost. 14 This average includes zero-death
observations (i.e., the minimum expected death is zero) The standard
deviation is 0.0821, so there is a fair amount of variability in deaths for
this measure (coefﬁcient of variation of 1.83). As we aggregate up
from trail to peak deaths, the average expected death number is
essentially constant (from 0.0450 to 0.0423), and the standard deviation
shrinks (coefﬁcient of variation goes from 1.83 to 1.57). The aggregation
decreases the variance of the distribution while keeping the mean
constant, because we are removing variation across trails on each
peak. (This is precisely the issue that Lalive (2003) discusses: aggregation masks the true heterogeneity or variance of risks.) We still have
zero observations at the peak-level death rate, but there are fewer of
them.
When we aggregate up to the regional level (third row of Table 1),
all the zeros and all the variation across peaks are removed, so we are
left with only variation over time. This is reﬂected in the relatively low
coefﬁcient of variation of 1.24. One problem with this measure is that
the average expected deaths increases to 0.0647. (This is being driven
by three peaks of eleven that account for most of the expeditions: Ama
Dablam, Cho Oyu and Everest.) It doesn't seem reasonable that expected
deaths would be this large for expeditions on all trails. While we
ultimately will not put much faith in this particular VSL estimate, we still
report and discuss it to highlight the effects of aggregation on the VSL for
these data. Aggregate measures of fatality risk most certainly distort VSL
estimates, and this is a problem with typical labor market studies from
census data. Industry-wide or occupation-wide fatality measures can be
likened to our regional level fatality measure. They remove an important
source of disaggregate variability (heterogeneity), and they may simply
bias risk/reward estimates.
Notice that all the expected death measures in Table 1 have very
large maximal values (0.4423, 0.3884, 0.5797, and 0.4422). This is
being driven by a few very large expeditions facing “normal” fatality
rates. For example, there was one expedition that faced a three-year
moving average fatality rate of 0.0143, but there were 37 paid climbers
at risk. We do not treat these observations as outliers, since they are
“highly visible events” in the industry, and the expectations of guides
can certainly be shaped by the occurrence (or lack of occurrence) of a
catastrophic event on these expeditions.

13
Restricting the sample to guide companies with published web pricing could
introduce a selection bias if those guide companies have systematically different risk
behaviors that the rest of the guide company population. A quick correlation analysis
suggests that this is not the case. The correlation between having a website and
number of recorded deaths in the data was 0.08 and the correlation between having a
website and the number of (at risk) members per expedition was − 0.04.
14
The reader is reminded that expected deaths is based on fatality rates which are
culled from all relevant expeditions on the particular trail and not just the 155
expeditions in the ﬁnal sample.

Lagged variables are also created for each of the expected deaths
variables for use as instruments in the IV model. The lagged expected
deaths are lagged by exactly one three-year period. Additional
intervals were tried, both in the calculation of the expected deaths
variable (e.g., one year periods, two year periods) and in the
calculation of the lag (e.g., two period lag). Shorter time intervals
resulted in the “too many zeroes” problem and were dismissed. When
longer time intervals were used it severely reduced the number of
observations. Therefore, our choice of a three-year using average was
effectively data-driven.
2.3. Revenue data
Since our dependent variable is expedition revenue and since the
Himalayan Database does not contain these data, we had to exploit
other sources to obtain them. The guides in each expedition are all
employees of the same professional company. In most cases, though
not all, the leader of a given expedition is the owner or CEO of the
company. Almost all of these companies list their prices publically on
their websites. The company for each expedition is identiﬁed in the
Himalayan Database and the per-client prices were collected from
each of the company websites. We assume the price paid is the
advertised price, (i.e., no discounts, add-ons, or negotiated prices).
Initially we used only current posted pricing (collected in December
2008) for our revenue measure and estimated VSLs between $3.8 M
and $5.1 M, but we could only use about 50–80 observations for these
estimates. Therefore, we sought to ﬁnd historical pricing to expand
the data in the (pseudo) time dimension.
To get historical prices, we used the internet Wayback Machine
which archives “snap shots” of websites over time (several times per
year). We discuss its functionality below. Using the Wayback Machine
we collected offer prices for expeditions that took place after 1996.
The data were collected from the Wayback Machine in October of
2009. Inﬂation adjustments are made using a calculator from the
website Inﬂationdata.com. The inﬂation rate for a given expedition is
calculated as the rate from January of the year of the expedition to
January 2008. In this way all results are in 2008 dollars. International
conversions are calculating using the conversion rate published on
www.x-rates.com. The rate used is that from the ﬁrst month of the
season of the expedition. That is, spring expeditions use the March
conversion rate, summer expeditions use June, fall expeditions use
September, and winter expeditions use December. The rates are ﬁrst
converted to US dollars in the year of the expedition, then the inﬂation
rate is applied to convert to 2008 USD. The price is multiplied by the
total number of expedition clients to generate total revenues. Clearly,
our revenue variable is subject to many forms of measurement error,
but they are the best available data on Himalayan climbs.
The Wayback Machine is a web crawler archiving service. Crawlers,
also called spiders, are sent out to survey the World Wide Web. These
crawlers collect all of the details of a given website and send the
information back to the Wayback Machine server. The server then puts
the website back together, catalogs it, and archives it for retrieval by the
public. Little has been written about the reliability of the archives (e.g.,
Hashim et al., 2007), but the archives are currently being used for
litigation purposes (Howell, 2006), so we suspect that understanding

J. Goucher, W.C. Horrace / Labour Economics 19 (2012) 27–32

the efﬁcacy of crawler technology for data collection and validity will be
a high-priority in the scholarly literature in the near future.
It is believed that the crawlers visit and archive each publically
available website (approximately 16 million of them) every two
months (Hashim et al., 2007), but this is obviously not a static
number. However, with archives updated ﬁve or six times a year in an
industry where companies only generate Himalayan revenues once or
twice per year, we suspect that any publically available internet price
changes are being captured by the crawlers within three to four
months of their occurrence. Unfortunately, the crawlers only record
the date that the website is captured and not the date that the website
changed, therefore we cannot record the exact date of the price
change and, hence, our prices are measured with error. However,
there is no reason to believe that price changes and the activities of
the crawlers are correlated (we explore this in limited detail below),
so any measurement error in our pricing data is likely to be random. 15
Although the crawlers are using a priority code to select websites for
archiving, the collection process appears random for the archived
websites we visited. That is, the frequency of crawler visits was
approximately the same across websites. There are several ways in
which crawlers can be prioritized. Often the priority methods are
centered around the popularity of the site. That is, sites that are visited
more often get a higher archival priority. (We suspect that mountain
guide sites are not highly-visited relative to all other 16 million websites
on the internet.) Additionally, owners of websites can opt out of the
archival process. However none of these issues seem to be inﬂuencing
the websites where we collected data. (All sites appeared to be archived
at fairly regular intervals.) In the archives, expedition prices were
typically updated every one or two years, and since the crawlers visit the
websites several times a year we were able to verify price stability across
any one or two year period (we did this only sporadically). In the end we
did not collect all the pricing data for a given company. We simply
search archived prices three months before and after the expedition and
recorded the price two months before the start data of the expedition.16
As a preliminary exercise we relate the “per client” price to fatality
rates for each of our 155 expeditions in Table 2 for the deciles of “per
client” price. Each decile in the table represents a single expedition's
price across the distribution of prices. As we can see, as price increases
down the second column in the table, the expected fatality rate in the
third column is generally increasing (based on the three-year moving
average fatalities, using our trail/peak/region deﬁnition of the fatality
rate). That is, for our sample, guides tend to charge more per client
when risks appear higher on a particular trail/peak/region. The only
real aberration in Table 2 is the twentieth decile, where the fatality
rate is relatively high (0.027). This expedition's average fatality rate is
high because of a single death in only 37 at risk climbers on Annapurna
IV (very few attempted climbs, relatively speaking). 17
3. Model and results
To estimate the tradeoff between revenue and death we estimate
the following hedonic regression:

ln Ri = α + β ln deathsi + γ ln daysi + δ ln experiencei + εi ; i = 1; …; n;

15
In our personal communications with a few climbing companies, we determined
that price changes typically occur every one or two years and never more than
annually. This was also our experience with the Wayback Machine. Since these are
small business with owners engaged in production, more effort is placed on climbing
than on ﬁnancial manipulations of the business.
16
Informal communications revealed that the down-payment is typically due two
months before the expedition and ﬁnal payment one month before the expedition.
17
As a robustness check we also performed the analysis with this observation
removed. Our results changed only slightly. In column IV of Table 3 the deaths
coefﬁcient change from 0.912 to 0.930 and the VSL changed from $4.69 M to $4.81 M.
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Table 2
Per client prices and fatality rates.
Decile

Per client price

3-year moving average fatalities
Trail/Peak/Region

10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90

$5,627
$7,813
$9,118
$10,208
$12,350
$13,940
$16,764
$20,130
$42,193

0.001
0.027
0.001
0.004
0.006
0.006
0.002
0.007
0.009

where i indexes expedition. We have repeated observations over
guides, over peaks and over trails on peaks, which we do not make
explicit in the notation. There is also a time dimension to the data
which we do not make explicit, but that we do use for purposes of
identiﬁcation (i.e., we use lagged deaths as an instrument for current
deaths). Here Ri is total expedition revenue. The variable deathsi is the
three-year moving average of expected deaths of paid climbers
measured at different levels of aggregation (e.g., trail-level or peaklevel), daysi is the expedition length, and experiencei is the total
number of climbs in the entire Himalayan database for the lead guide
at the start date of the expedition. The 2SLS estimate β̂, using lagged
deathsi as an instrument, is the marginal rate of substitution between
paid-climber revenue and paid-climber deaths, and our VSL estimate
is the usual V̂SL = n−1 β̂∑i Ri = deathsi . As such our VSL estimate
reﬂects professional climbers' valuations of their own lives and not
their valuations of their client's lives.
Our model does not include guide, trail, peak, or time ﬁxed effects,
as these variables were largely insigniﬁcant, and even if they were
included in the speciﬁcation, they did not have a large effect on the
magnitude of our estimated VSL. We also had information on the
height of the climb and the difﬁculty of the climb, but these were
highly correlated with daysi and were excluded. 18 The few safetyrelated measures (e.g., rope and oxygen) that we had, were
insigniﬁcant. Again, we view the marginal product of labor as the
marginal product for safety, so once revenues are measured, all safetyrelated productivity (observed or unobserved) is accounted for in the
hedonic regression. Even so, our experience variable is certainly a
proxy for a guides ability and, hence, his ability to “produce” safety.
Our ﬁnal data set consists of 155 expeditions over 10 years (however
our fatality rates are based on 3-year moving averages from 4372
expeditions over 21 years). The expeditions were led by 89 guides,
representing eleven countries. The majority of the guides were from the
U.S. (29), the UK (25) and Germany (12). Other countries include
Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Poland and Switzerland. We do not have enough observations to
conﬁdently calculate VSLs for each country, so our VSL estimate is an
international ﬁgure for developed countries, however the ﬁgure is
dominated by U.S. and UK guides. 19
Results are contained in Table 3, and our general ﬁnding is that higher
levels of aggregation in the expected deaths variable reduce the average
VSL measure. When expected deaths is average deaths on the same trail
(column I), 2SLS yields a signiﬁcant risk/reward coefﬁcient of 0.924, and a
robust standard error of 0.182. This regression only includes 78
observations, because observations with no deaths on the trail within a
three-year period or no deaths in the lagged period (for the instrument)

18
Plausible results were achieved using the height of the climb, and VSL results were
slightly higher for all four measures of expected death.
19
Sherpas are from Nepal, so they may be lowering our VSL estimates, but if the nonwage costs of the expedition are folded into Sherpa wages, then perhaps, their portion
of the VSL is more in line with that of a developed nation.
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Table 3
2SLS and VSL estimates for various expected death measures.
Variable

2SLS

2SLS

2SLS

2SLS

I

II

III

IV

–

–

–

Deaths (peak)

0.924
(0.182)
–

–

–

Deaths (region)

–

0.728
(0.124)
–

–

Deaths
(trail/peak/region)
Days

–

–

0.781
(0.081)
–

0.641
(0.211)
0.005
(0.054)
114
38.29
$165,295
0.0494
133
$4.05 M

0.723
(0.124)
0.041
(0.051)
155
140.5
$147,978
0.0647
155
$1.98 M⁎

Deaths (trail)

0.608
(0.205)
Experience
− 0.043
(0.084)
Observations
78
1st stage F-test
14.95
VSL average revenues $171,685
VSL average deaths
0.0570
VSL observations
120
VSL
$5.39 M

0.912
(0.262)
0.424
(0.349)
0.028
(0.081)
155
21.48
$147,978
0.0517
155
$4.69 M

First-stage regressions include experience and days as regressors.
Dependent variable in second-stage regression is the logarithm of Revenues.
All regressors are in logarithms.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
⁎ The VSL estimate of $1.98 M is not reliable due to mis-measurement of deaths.

are dropped from the regression.20 This results in an average VSL measure
of $5.39 M, based on 120 observations.21 In column I we also see that the
average of the 120 expected trail deaths was 0.0570 lives and the average
revenues on these 120 expeditions was $171,685. Both of these values are
higher than the sample averages of 0.0450 expected deaths and $147,978,
based on 155 observations (Table 1).22 However, the ratio of the values
($/death) is approximately equal, implying that the lost zero-death
observations may not be effecting our average VSL results. The VSL
estimate of $5.39 M is reasonable except for the fact that it is based on few
observations. To increase our effective sample size we considered
estimates using higher levels of aggregated expected deaths. When all
of the deaths at the peak-level are used for the expected death rate on the
trail (column II) the risk/reward coefﬁcient is 0.728 (0.124). The average
VSL estimate is $4.05 M, based on 133 observation with averages of 0.423
deaths and $165,295 in revenues. These are fairly stable results despite
the fact that zero-death trails are either dropped or set to the higher peak
death level across the analyses.
Then we aggregated one more time to include all deaths in the
Himalayan region (column III). In this case all of the variability in the
fatality rate is in the time dimension (i.e., no variation across trails and
peaks). The risk/reward coefﬁcient is 0.781 (0.081) and the average
VSL estimate is $1.96 M. We do not put much faith in this estimate,
because the fatality rate aggregation distorts the true expect deaths. In
this case we can see that the average expected deaths is a rather large
0.0647 lives. We report these results for completeness only.
Ultimately the most satisfying method we employ is to use higher
levels of aggregation only when lower levels are unavailable (deaths,
trail/peak/region). The idea is that if the agent knows the lower level of
fatality rates, this will be most important in determining risk. However, if
there have been no fatalities on a given trail in the most recent three year
period, then the guide considers the fatality rate on the peak. If there have
been no fatalities on trail or peak in the given period then the guide
20
Obviously with 78 observations, standard inference requires a normality
assumption on the regression errors.
21
Forty-two additional observations with non-zero expected deaths and zero lagged
expected deaths can be included in the VSL calculation that were not in the 78
regression observations.
22
The reader is reminded that that the average expected death measures in Table 1
includes some zero-valued observations (in 155 observations) while the average death
measures in Table 3 do not. Hence the difference in Table 3 Columns I and II relative to
the ﬁrst two rows of Table 1.

considers the fatality rate in the region. Using this method we obtain a
risk/reward coefﬁcient of .912 (.262) in column IV of Table 1. The mean
VSL is $4.69 M based on average values of deaths and revenues for all 155
observations of 0.0517 and $147,978. The VSL of $4.69 M lies between our
other two reliable measures of $4.05 M and $5.39 M.
It is not difﬁcult to speculate on the direction of VSL biases that
might result from changing the levels of aggregation, dropping zeroobservations, or imputing higher levels of aggregation within a
particular aggregation of expected death. However, the relative
stability of our VSL estimates over our three preferred methods of
measuring expected deaths is undeniable.
4. Conclusions
This paper estimates a VSL of $4.05 M–$5.39 M using data on
Himalayan expeditions over the past decade. In 2008 the U.S. Dept. of
Transportation established $5.8 M as the agency's benchmark VSL
(Viscusi, 2009). Our VSL estimate at the most disaggregate level is
$5.39 M, which is quite close to the US DOT value. Perhaps, the policy
is the correct one. Our results are similar to the those of Schnier,
Horrace and Felthoven (2009) who had a much larger sample, but
used more aggregate measures of expected death.
Unfortunately, we did have a problem ﬁnding historical revenue
data and had to resort to using the internet Wayback Machine to
record pricing. However, we believe that any error we may have
induced in the process is random, so our regression estimates should
not be biased. (Besides it is widely held that measurement error in a
dependent variable is fairly innocuous in a regression context.) We
believe that ours is the ﬁrst study to use archived internet data for the
purposes of regression analysis, and it is interesting to speculate how
the Wayback machine might be used in subsequent research.
For future research, we would like to survey climbing companies and
collect data on historical revenues to verify the accuracy of the present
VSL results. It is also interesting to think of the mountain guide industry
as a form of life insurance without moral hazard (i.e., where the
behaviors of the insured, paying climbers, are directly observed by the
insurers, the paid guides). Perhaps something could be done to exploit
this unique feature of the industry and data.
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